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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order denying in part a motion to 
compel arbitration and staying arbitration on other claims. 
Jurisdiction is therefore granted under Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 78-31a-19(l) and (2). The jurisdictional issues in this case 
have been fully briefed in response to the Court's sua sponte 
motion regarding jurisdiction; this Court concluded, in its Order 
dated August 8, 1997, that an immediate right of direct appeal 
exists. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
plaintiffs have not agreed to arbitrate their claims that Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") failed to provide them with 
an appropriate conversion policy. 
This issue was raised and argued at several different points 
in the case below, including in BCBSU's original Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings Against Defendant Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Utah (R. 9 et seq.) , in the memorandum supporting 
that motion (R. 12 et seq.), in appellant's objection to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend or Clarify Ruling (R. 198 et seg.), 
in BCBSU's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
BCBSU's Motion to Reconsider, (R. 209 et seg.) and in Defendant's 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider. (R 233 et 
seg. ) 
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The Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions 
interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause as an issue of 
law, without deferring to the trial judge's interpretation. 
Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 
(Utah 1986). 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-703 (1997) reads in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Conversion rights on termination of group disability 
insurance coverage 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (5), 
all policies of disability insurance offered on a group 
basis under this title, or Title 49, Chapter 8, Group 
Insurance Program Act shall provide that a person whose 
insurance under the group policy has been terminated 
for any reason, and who has been continuously insured 
under the group policy or its predecessor for at least 
six months immediately prior to termination, is 
entitled to choose either a converted individual or 
group policy of disability insurance from the insurer 
which conforms to this part and other applicable 
versions of this title, or an extension of benefits 
under the group policy as provided in Section 31A-22-
714. 
In addition, Section 3 of the Utah Arbitration Act provides: 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or 
equity to set aside the agreement or when fraud is 
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 3 1 a - 3 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order denying, in part, a motion 
to compel arbitration and staying arbitration as to those claims 
determined to be arbitrable. 
Plaintiffs (the "0'Connells") have been and remain BCBSU 
subscribers under different healthcare agreements for over 20 
years. R.l. From time to time, they obtained this coverage by 
virtue of their memberships in different groups. R.2. Mrs. 
O'Connell was an employee of Rowland Hall-St. Mark's, and the 
couple obtained coverage from BCBSU at times under that group 
policy. R.2-3. Mr. O'Connell is a member of the Utah State Bar. 
R.2. The couple have also obtained BCBSU coverage in the past 
under the State Bar group policy. R.2. 
The latest instance of coverage under these two groups was 
obtained by the 0'Connells in 1993. R.2. On September 30, 1993, 
Mrs. O'Connell completed an application for coverage through 
Rowland Hall-St. Mark's. R.79. In making that application, Mrs. 
O'Connell agreed to the following language: 
I accept binding arbitration as a method of resolving 
any disputes arising between me or the covered family 
members in the Plan or participating provider 
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concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable 
under the Subscriber Agreement. 
R. 79. 
The O'Connells were accepted onto the Rowland Hall-St. 
Mark's policy in 1993, and were given a healthcare agreement (the 
"Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement") reading in part 
as follows: 
In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning 
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach 
of the Agreement arising between the Group, employer, 
or Subscriber, eligible Family Dependent, or the heir-
at-law or personal representative of such person, and 
BCBSU, whether involving a claim in tort, contract or 
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to arbitration 
under the appropriate rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. Any arbitration shall be conducted in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, unless mutually agreed otherwise 
by the parties. All fees connected with initiating 
demand for arbitration shall be split between and 
advanced by the parties to the arbitration; subject, 
however, to final apportionment by the arbitrator in 
his or her award. The parties agree that the 
arbitrator's award shall be binding and may be enforced 
in any court having jurisdiction thereof by filing a 
petition for enforcement of said award. 
R. 85. 
In 1995, the O'Connells attempted to switch their coverage 
from Rowland Hall-St. Mark's to the Utah State Bar group. R. 44. 
The application for the Utah State Bar coverage contains language 
virtually identical to that quoted above for the application for 
the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's coverage, R. 44, and the Utah State 
Bar Healthcare Agreement contains language virtually identical to 
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that contained in the Healthcare Agreement issued to members of 
the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's group, including Mrs. O'Connell. R. 
41. The O'Connells' application to resubscribe to the Utah State 
Bar group was rejected based on Mrs. O'Connells' medical history. 
R.3. 
BCBSU, pursuant to the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare 
Agreement, issued the O'Connells a conversion policy after her 
continuation coverage under the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Health 
Care Agreement expired. R. 48. 
II, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The O'Connells sued BCBSU designating four causes of action. 
First, they claimed that the refusal to provide coverage under 
what they perceived as the more favorable Utah State Bar 
Healthcare Agreement breached the terms of the Rowland Hall-St. 
Mark's Agreement. R. 5. Second, they alleged that BCBSU had 
made oral promises that they could freely move back and forth 
between the Bar group and the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's group. R. 
6. Third, they alleged that BCBSU "has breached its contract and 
statutory obligation to provide individual coverage to plaintiffs 
comparable to that provided through the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's 
group at a reasonable rate and not based upon condition of the 
plaintiff's health." R. 6. Finally, they alleged that BCBSU's 
refusal to accept them onto the Utah State Bar coverage violated 
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some "constructive duty to deal with plaintiffs fairly and in 
good faith" based allegedly upon the "long-standing relationship 
between plaintiffs and [BCBSU]." R. 8. 
BCBSU moved to compel arbitration as to all of these claims. 
R. 9. After detailed briefing, the trial court granted the 
motion to compel arbitration on October 8, 1996. R. 183-190. On 
October 16, plaintiffs moved to amend or clarify that ruling. R. 
192. The basis for this was plaintiffs' claim that a portion of 
their claims were based on a statutory right under Utah Code 
Annotated § 31A-22-701-718, which requires group healthcare 
insurance policies to provide for a conversion right. R.192-196. 
On December 18, 1996, the trial court modified its prior order, 
stating in pertinent part: 
The Court finds the issue of whether defendant met its 
statutory obligation pursuant to the applicable 
sections of 31A-22-701(-)718 can be and is severed from 
the other issues in this case, and amends its judgment 
accordingly. The Court finds that the language of the 
arbitration provision signed by the plaintiff does not 
appear to address the issue of whether defendant has 
provided the plaintiffs with a conversion policy in 
accordance to the statute previously mentioned. 
Further, even if the arbitration provisions 
specifically provided for the matter of defendant's 
compliance with the statute, the Court has some 
reservations in leaving such issues of statutory 
interpretation to arbitration. 
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R. 206. The Court then went on to direct the parties to brief 
the issue of whether the conversion policy issued to the 
plaintiff complied with the conversion statute. R.206-207. 
Rather than brief this issue, BCBSU requested that the trial 
court reconsider its ruling, arguing that the conversion rights 
were covered by the arbitration provisions at issue. R.209-220. 
On April 8, 1997, the trial court denied this motion to 
reconsider, stayed arbitration and ordered BCBSU to file an 
answer concerning plaintiffs' so-called statutory claims. R. 248 
and 249. BCBSU then took this appeal. R. 251. 
III. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
In sum, the district court rejected plaintiffs' arguments 
that they had not agreed to arbitration, but later concluded that 
the statutory claim for a comparable conversion policy was not 
covered by the arbitration clauses at issue. R. 183-190; R. 206. 
This appeal concerns that interpretation of the breadth of those 
arbitration provisions, and the nature of the conversion right to 
which the O'Connells make claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The conversion right is a contractual right, provided in 
this case within the O'Connells' Rowland Hall-St. Mark's 
Healthcare Agreement. The Utah statutes governing conversion 
merely impose substantive requirements on that BCBSU contract. 
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The statute, by its unambiguous terms, does not create an 
independent cause of action. 
Regardless, however, of whether the right to conversion is 
viewed as contractual or statutory, it cannot be maintained that 
"conversion" does not contemplate an existing healthcare 
agreement. Without such agreement, there is nothing from which 
to "convert." BCBSU's provision of a conversion policy, or 
failure to provide an appropriate one, is necessarily part of 
BCBSU's performance under its original healthcare agreement, in 
this case the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement. The 
O'Connells' claim that Blue Cross has not provided an appropriate 
conversion policy is therefore plainly covered by the broad 
arbitration clause contained in that original Rowland Hall-St. 
Mark's Healthcare Agreement. This claim necessarily concerns the 
"construction, interpretation, performance or breach of" that 
original Agreement. Indeed, the plaintiffs' claim is founded on 
the notion the conversion policy is somehow not comparable to 
that original coverage. The trial court erred in severing out 
the conversion claim from the other claims raised in this case 
and in failing to compel arbitration with respect to all claims. 
ARGUMENT 
A conversion right is the right to convert insurance under a 
group policy to an individual policy. Appleman, Insurance Law 
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and Practice, § 126 (West 1981). The right sought by the 
O'Connells in this case is the right to obtain an individual 
policy following the termination of Mrs. O'Connells' eligibility 
for continuing coverage as a member of the Rowland Hall-St. 
Mark's group. More specifically, the O'Connells claim a right to 
a policy with premiums comparable to the former group policy. 
Blue Cross has issued the O'Connells a conversion policy, but 
maintains that it is not required to provide it at the same price 
as that of their former group policy. 
That legal issue, however, is not before the Court. 
Instead, this appeal concerns whether this dispute is subject to 
an arbitration provision in the O'Connells' Healthcare Agreement 
with Blue Cross. The O'Connells' claim is based on a contractual 
right, and Blue Cross's provision of the conversion policy to the 
O'Connells necessarily arises out of its contractual relationship 
with them. As such, this dispute is subject to the mandatory 
arbitration provision contained in the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's 
Healthcare Agreement. 
I. THE CONVERSION RIGHT IS CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE 
The Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement addresses 
the right of conversion. It provides: 
5. Group eligibility discontinued. In the event the 
Subscriber ceases to be eligible for group coverage in 
accordance with then effective rules and regulations of 
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BCBSU pertaining to enrollment, this Certificate and 
all coverage hereunder shall automatically terminate 
effective as of the first month's anniversary of the 
Effective Date following the date on which the 
Subscriber ceases to be eligible for group coverage. 
Any such Subscriber who has been covered under this 
Certificate for a period of at least six months may, 
within thirty (30) days after termination of this 
Certificate, apply for conversion of coverage in 
accordance with then effective rules and regulations of 
BCBSU pertaining to enrollment. 
R. 244. It is this right to convert, provided under the 
contract, that the O'Connells seek to enforce. 
The O'Connells have pointed to Utah's conversion statute as 
providing them a separate right. The unambiguous terms of that 
statute show that, rather than create an abstract right to 
conversion, the statute merely imposes substantive requirements 
on the underlying contracts. Specifically, the statute requires 
that 
all policies of disability insurance1 offered on a 
group basis under this title . . . shall provide that a 
person whose insurance under group policy has been 
terminated for any reason . . . is entitled to choose 
either a converted individual group policy of 
disability insurance from the insurer . . . or an 
extension of benefits under the group policy as 
provided in Section 31A-22-714. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-703 (1997) . Thus, the statute imposes a 
requirement on the contract terms, and the insured's underlying 
1
 The term "disability insurance," as defined by the Utah 
Insurance Code, includes the health insurance provided by BCBSU to the 
O'Connells. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-1-301(26) and (35) (1997). 
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right to claim conversion thus arises out of that contractual 
relationship. 
This obvious proposition is supported by more than the 
literal terms of the statute. There is no free-floating right to 
be accepted onto an individual policy available to the public at 
large. At the time the O'Connells obtained their conversion 
policy2, their right to do so depended on prior enrollment in a 
group policy. Thus, the issuance of the conversion policy is 
part and parcel of the insurer's performance of its obligations 
under that prior group policy relationship. Absent that prior 
relationship under the group policy of Rowland Hall-St. Mark's, 
Blue Cross had no obligation whatsoever to issue any sort of 
policy to the O'Connells. 
II. THE O'CONNELLS' ASSERTED RIGHT TO CONVERSION 
FALLS WITHIN THE CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
The clause in the O'Connells' Rowland Hall-St. Mark's 
Healthcare Agreement requiring arbitration is broad. It reads: 
2
 The O'Connells' ability to obtain replacement coverage has 
changed significantly since their earlier application that generated 
this lawsuit. With the passage and implementation of the federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), P.L. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), they can now obtain the State Bar 
coverage without respect to any pre-existing medical condition, so 
long as they remain eligible and possess sufficiently continuous 
creditable coverage, which they presently do. That change in law, 
however, did not impact BCBSU's denial of enrollment on the State Bar 
plan in 1995. 
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bf 
C V
 'c ^ 
In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning 
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach 
of this Agreement arising between the Employer, 
Subscriber, Eligible Family Member, and the Heir-at*-Law 
or Personal Representative of such person and BCBSU, 
whether involving a claim in tort, contract or 
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to arbitration 
under the appropriate rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. 
R. 166 (emphasis added). 
In addition, when applying for this group policy, Ann O'Connell 
signed directly below the following language: 
rCfc 
% 
I accept Binding Arbitration as the method of resolving 
any disputes arising between me or the covered family 
members and the Plan [defined as Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Utah, ValueCare and/or HealthWise] or a 
participating provider concerning the applicability of, 
or benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement. 
R. 162 (emphasis added) Finally, the Certificate given to the 
O'Connells provides in addition as follows, under the heading 
V ^ * * * 
(<.' 
"Claims Appeal Procedure": 




Binding arbitration is the final step for the 
resolution of any dispute a member has with BCBSU. 
Steps One, Two and Three of this appeals procedure must 
be exhausted before arbitration is available. [Steps 
One, Two and Three involve bringing claims to the 
customer service department, the claims appeal 
committee and BCBSU's legal counsel, respectively.] 
When one enrolls with BCBSU, he or she agrees that any 
dispute will be resolved by binding arbitration, and 
agrees to give up the right to a jury or a court trial 
for the settlement of such disputes. 
R. 165 (emphasis added) 
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The O'Connells now claim that BCBSU has failed to issue an 
appropriate conversion policy from this original group policy. 
This claim constitutes a dispute with BCBSU. It involves the 
construction and interpretation of the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's 
group policy. As discussed above, the right to conversion, as 
well as BCBSU's provision of the conversion policy involves the 
performance and alleged breach of the original Rowland Hall-
St. Mark's policy. Even the O'Connells' pleading reflects this 
simple fact. In pleading this claim to the district court, the 
0'Connells alleged: 
Defendant has breached its contract and statutory 
obligation to provide individual coverage to plaintiffs 
comparable to that provided through the Rowland Hall 
group at a reasonable rate and not based upon condition 
of the plaintiff's health. 
R. 6 (emphasis added). 
These claims plainly fall within the scope of the multiple 
arbitration provisions applicable to the O'Connells' Rowland 
Hall-St. Mark's policy. First, the right to conversion is 
provided within the same contract containing the arbitration 
clause requiring all disputes "concerning the construction, 
interpretation, performance or breach of" that contract. R.166. 
Plaintiffs have plead a breach of that right. Second, even if a 
parallel statutory claim existed, it still constitutes, by 
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definition, a claim concerning the performance or breach of the 
original agreement. 
An analogous circumstance exists when a claim for benefits 
is brought under a conversion policy issued obtained through 
conversion from an ERISA-covered plan. In such case, the 
plaintiff seeking benefits typically wishes to avoid the 
preemptive scope of the ERISA statute. Because the converted 
policy is an individual policy, the argument goes, preemption 
applicable to claims under the group policy does not affect the 
claim for benefits under the conversion policy. Several courts 
have rejected this argument, recognizing that the claim for 
benefits under the conversion policy arises out of the original 
group benefits provided under the ERISA plan. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, has 
reasoned: 
The opportunity to convert the group plan to an 
individual policy is a benefit provided pursuant to the 
group plan . . . the predicate to the conversion right, 
under both ERISA and Montana law, is qualification as a 
beneficiary under a group health or disability plan. 
. . . No conversion benefits would be available unless 
the party seeking the conversion policy was an eligible 
insured beneficiary of a group plan. 
The group plan within this case, which the [plaintiffs] 
admit is an ERISA plan, provides for the conversion 
benefit. Because the [plaintiffs] would not be 
eligible for a conversion policy without first 
belonging to the class of beneficiaries covered by the 
ERISA group plan, we conclude that the individual 
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conversion benefits are part of the ERISA plan and are 
thus governed by ERISA. Had the [plaintiffs] not 
received health benefits pursuant to the ERISA group 
plan, they would not have been eligible to receive* 
conversion benefits and would have no cause of action 
arising from the conversion policy. 
Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 817 
(9th Cir. 1992) . See also Tingey v. Picks ley-Richards West, 
Inc., 953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992); Quails v. Blue Cross of 
California, 22 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1994) (both holding that 
conversion policy arises out of original ERISA coverage, and 
therefore claim for benefits is preempted). Similarly, any claim 
the O'Connells might raise concerning their conversion coverage, 
or BCBSU's alleged failure to provide appropriate conversion 
coverage, necessarily presupposes a pre-existing contractual 
relationship with BCBSU. Without such a relationship, there is 
no right to conversion. Accordingly, all of the O'Connells' 
potential claims concerning their conversion rights necessarily 
arise out of the performance by BCBSU of its original contractual 
obligations. Without that original contract, there is no claim. 
It need hardly be said that Utah law requires arbitration 
provisions to be construed broadly, in favor of arbitration. 
Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 
(Utah 1986); Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 
1073 (Utah 1981) (quoting King County v. Boeing Co., 18 Wash. 
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App. 595, 570 P.2d 713, 717 (1977). Any doubts concerning the 
applicability of arbitration are likewise to be resolved in favor 
of arbitration. Id. The O'Connells' claim that the conversion 
policy issued to them pursuant to their Rowland Hall-St. Mark's 
Healthcare Agreement is not comparable to their coverage under 
the original Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement falls 
unambiguously within the broad language of the arbitration 
provisions of that group policy. Utah law requires that all of 
the O'Connells' claims be arbitrated, and the district court 
erred in severing this claim from the O'Connells' other claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in refusing to compel arbitration 
as to all of the O'Connells' claims against BCBSU in this matter. 
Each such claim is plainly subject to the broad arbitration 
clauses agreed to by the O'Connells. The Court should reverse 
the district court's order severing out the conversion claim and 
remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration as to all 
claims. In addition, the remand order should direct the entry of 
a reasonable attorneys' fee for BCBSU in connection with the 
district court proceedings and this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31a-16 (1997). 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
The relevant statutes and portions of the Record (including 
the relevant contractual provisions) are quoted in the brief. 
Appellant believes an Addendum is unnecessary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of December, 1997. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By_ 
Andrews H. S tone 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendan t 
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